We study a generalization of the classical stable matching problem that allows for cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal) and fractional matchings (as opposed to integral). After observing that, in this cardinal setting, stable fractional matchings can have much higher social welfare than stable integral ones, our goal is to understand the computational complexity of finding an optimal (i.e., welfare-maximizing) or nearly-optimal stable fractional matching. We present simple approximation algorithms for this problem with weak welfare guarantees and, rather unexpectedly, we furthermore show that achieving better approximations is hard. This computational hardness persists even for approximate stability. To the best of our knowledge, these are the first computational complexity results for stable fractional matchings. En route to these results, we provide a number of structural observations.
full-time with a single supervisor. On the other hand, fractional matchings allow the employees to divide their time in working with multiple supervisors, making them a more natural modeling choice in such situations. Likewise, ordinal preferences, despite their simplicity and ease of elicitation, can often be quite restrictive. Indeed, in many real-world matching applications (e.g., labor markets), the outcomes experienced by the participants are inherently cardinal in nature (e.g., wages). In such settings, it is decidedly more natural to model the intensity of preferences, as has been noted in theory [3, 30] as well as in lab experiments [13] . Encouraged by these insights, and the fact that cardinal utilities provide a clean and unambiguous way of comparing matching outcomes in terms of their social welfare, we consider a generalization of the stable matching model that allows for fractional matchings (as opposed to integral) and cardinal preferences (as opposed to ordinal). More concretely, we consider a setting where the preferences are specified in terms of valuations (e.g., in the matching instance in Figure 1 , m 1 values w 1 at 0 and w 1 values m 1 at 3). A fractional matching is simply a convex combination of integral matchings, and an agent's utility under a fractional matching is the appropriately weighted sum of its utilities under the constituent integral matchings. A fractional matching µ is stable if no pair of man and woman simultaneously derive greater utility in being integrally matched to each other than they do under µ.
The above generalization has a clear merit in terms of social welfare: Stable solutions under the generalized model can have greater welfare than those under the standard model, as the following example illustrates. Example 1. Consider the instance in Figure 1 with three men m 1 , m 2 , m 3 and three women w 1 , w 2 , w 3 . Among the six possible integral matchings, only µ 1 {(m 1 , w 3 ), (m 2 , w 2 ), (m 3 , w 1 )} and µ 2 {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 3 ), (m 3 , w 2 )} are stable. Indeed, µ 1 and µ 2 are the men-proposing and women-proposing Gale-Shapley matchings respectively [16] . The social welfare (i.e., sum of utilities of all agents) under these matchings is W(µ 1 ) = W(µ 2 ) = 7.
Define µ 3 {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 ), (m 3 , w 3 )}, and notice that W(µ 3 ) = 8. Now consider a fractional matching µ 1 2 µ 2 + 1 2 µ 3 . The social welfare of µ is W(µ) = 1 2 W(µ 2 ) + 1 2 W(µ 3 ) = 15/2 > 7 = W(µ 1 ) = W(µ 2 ), i.e., µ has a higher social welfare than any stable integral matching. Importantly, µ is a stable fractional matching. Indeed, under µ, the utilities of m 1 , m 2 , m 3 , w 1 , w 2 , and w 3 are 0, 1 2 , 3 2 , 3, 3 2 , and 1 respectively. Thus, for every man-woman pair, at least one of the two agents meets the corresponding utility threshold for that pair, implying that µ is stable.
Overall, the instance in Figure 1 admits a stable fractional matching with strictly greater welfare than any stable integral matching.
Starting with the seminal work of Gale and Shapley [16] , there is now an extensive literature on algorithms for computing stable solutions, including ones that optimize a variety of objectives pertaining to fairness and economic efficiency [17, 21, 25, 29, 36] . Most of these algorithms, however, are tailored to compute stable integral matchings. As Example 1 demonstrates, such algorithms could, in general, return highly suboptimal outcomes in our setting. Therefore, it becomes pertinent to understand the computational complexity of finding an "optimal" stable matching in the generalized model. Our work studies this question from the lens of the fundamental objective of social welfare, and asks the following natural question:
Can we efficiently compute an optimal or nearly optimal stable fractional matching? EC'19 Session 1a: Theory of Matching Markets
Our results and roadmap
We formalize the above question by defining the optimization problem Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. To motivate this problem, we strengthen the observation in Example 1 to show that the social welfare gap between the best stable fractional and best stable integral matchings can be arbitrarily large. We show that the favorable welfare properties of stable fractional matchings come at the cost of limiting the algorithmic tools at our disposal. Specifically, we show that the set of stable fractional matchings can be non-convex, and that, in the worst case, stable fractional matchings can have a large support, thus prohibiting the use of support enumeration algorithms. Nevertheless, we present simple algorithms for Optimal Stable Fractional Matching with approximation ratio of 1 + σ max /σ min , where σ max and σ min represent the maximum and minimum positive valuation in the input instance, respectively. For the variant Optimal ε-Stable Fractional Matching, where the stability constraints are relaxed by an ε factor, an embarrassingly simple algorithm computes 1/ε-approximate solutions. We then proceed to our main result, which shows that these approximation guarantees are, somewhat surprisingly, almost the best achievable via polynomial-time algorithms (unless P = NP). To the best of our knowledge, these are the first computational complexity results for stable fractional matchings.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We present related work in the matching literature in Section 1.2. We continue in Section 2 with preliminary definitions and warm up with exponentialtime algorithms that solve Optimal Stable Fractional Matching using linear programming. Section 3 presents the structural properties of (nearly)-optimal solutions of Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. Our algorithms are presented in Section 4, and our inapproximability results are presented in Section 5. All missing proofs can be found in the full version of the paper [7] .
Further related work
The stable marriage problem has been extensively studied over the years [16, 18, 28, 34] with several interesting results in the original model of Gale and Shapley [16] as well as several of its variants [9, 20, 22, 24, 29] . The model of Gale and Shapley [16] admits efficient algorithms for finding stable matchings, but some of the above variants are computationally more challenging; we refer the interested reader to the survey of Iwama and Miyazaki [23] for a detailed exposition. Starting with the works of Vande Vate [37] , Rothblum [35] , and Roth et al. [32] , there is by now a well-developed literature on the linear programming formulations of the stable matching problem [36, 38] , and various combinatorial algorithms that optimize fairness-related objectives are also known [8, 15, 17, 21, 25] . However, the majority of this literature studies integral stable matchings under ordinal preferences.
The theoretical and practical importance of modeling agents' cardinal preferences in stable matching settings has been highlighted, among others, by Anshelevich et al. [4] and Pini et al. [30] . Anshelevich et al. [4] formulate the notions of exact/approximate stability in terms of cardinal preferences that are central to our work; see Definition 1. They study the "price of anarchy" for stable matchings (defined as the ratio of social welfare of the optimal matching and the worst stable integral matching) under various preference structures as well as its extensions to approximate stability. A similar approach has been adopted in related settings [2, 14] . Pini et al. [30] consider a notion of stability similar to [4] , but focus on achieving economic efficiency (in particular, Pareto optimality and its variants) along with stability. They also study strategic aspects which are an exciting avenue for future research even in our model.
In terms of computing efficient (i.e., welfare-maximizing or cost-minimizing) stable matchings, Irving et al. [21] , Manlove et al. [29] , and Mai and Vazirani [26] provide efficient algorithms and/or inapproximability results, but crucially, these results apply to integral matchings only. To the best of EC'19 Session 1a: Theory of Matching Markets our knowledge, the computational questions associated with computing stable fractional matchings have not been considered prior to our work.
Deligkas et al. [10] consider matchings computed by the natural greedy algorithm in edgeweighted graphs. Among other results, they show that the problem of computing the maximumweight greedy matching in a bipartite graph is NP-hard. The greedy matchings in their model are stable integral matchings in ours. Still, as we discuss in the full version [7] , this result implies the NP-hardness of Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. Our inapproximability results are much stronger though.
Our definition of fractional stability (in the presence of cardinal preferences) has appeared before in the economics literature [5, 11, 12, 19, 27] . However, these papers focus primarily on the relationship among various notions of stability and economic efficiency, and do not consider computational questions. We remark here that the term "fractional stability" has been overloaded in the related literature, as it has also been used to refer to fractional matchings that only have integral stable matchings in their support [36] ; note that stability in the latter context can be defined purely in terms of the ordinal preferences. This notion of "ex-post" stability is fundamentally different from ours, as it is precisely the existence of unstable integral matchings in the support of the stable fractional matching (see Proposition 3) that allows for the large gain in welfare in Example 1 and Theorem 1. If one is interested in the ex-post notion of stability, then the computational problem clearly reduces to the case of integral matchings.
PRELIMINARIES
An instance of Stable Matching problem with Cardinal preferences (SMC) is given by the tuple ⟨M,W , U , V ⟩, where M {m 1 , . . . , m n } and W {w 1 , . . . , w n } denote the set of n men and n women, respectively, and U and V are n × n matrices of non-negative rational numbers that specify the valuations of the agents. Specifically, U (m, w) is the value derived by man m from his match with woman w, and V (m, w) is the value derived by woman w from her match with man m. Many of our results will focus on two special classes of valuations, namely binary (where U , V ∈ {0, 1} n×n ) and ternary valuations (where U , V ∈ {0, 1, α } n×n for some α > 1).
We will often describe an SMC instance using its graph representation. An instance I = ⟨M,W , U , V ⟩ can be represented as a bipartite graph with vertex sets M and W , and an edge for every pair (m, w) ∈ M × W such that at least one of U (m, w) > 0 or V (m, w) > 0 holds. Each edge (m, w) in this graph has two valuations associated with it, namely U (m, w) and V (m, w).
A fractional matching µ : M × W → R ≥0 is an assignment of non-negative weights to all man-woman pairs such that w ∈W µ(m, w) ≤ 1 for each m ∈ M and m ∈M µ(m, w) ≤ 1 for each w ∈ W . A fractional matching µ is said to be complete if w ∈W µ(m, w) = 1 for each man m ∈ M and m ∈M µ(m, w) = 1 for each woman w ∈ W . An integral matching µ is a fractional matching with weights µ(m, w) ∈ {0, 1} for every pair (m, w). With slight abuse of notation, we sometimes view an integral matching µ as a set of pairs and write (m, w) ∈ µ instead of µ(m, w) = 1.
It is well-known, and follows from the Birkhoff-von Neumann (BvN) theorem, that a fractional matching µ can be decomposed into a convex combination of k = O(n 2 ) integral matchings µ (1) , µ (2) , . . . , µ (k ) so that for every pair (m, w) ∈ M × W , we have
where λ j > 0 for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k} and k j=1 λ j = 1. The set of integral matchings {µ (1) , . . . , µ (k ) } is called the support of the fractional matching µ. Note that the support need not be unique.
We proceed with the formal definitions of stability and approximate stability, which in turn use the definition of the utility derived by agents under a fractional matching. In particular, the utility A stable fractional matching is also ε-stable for every ε ≥ 0. The next statement follows from the seminal result of Gale and Shapley [16] . Proposition 1. Given any SMC instance I, a stable fractional matching µ for I always exists and can be computed in polynomial time.
Proposition 1 was originally proven in [16] in the standard stable matching model with ordinal preferences and integral matchings. It is easy to see that given any SMC instance I, if an integral matching µ is stable for an ordinal instance derived from I (where the ordinal preferences of each agent are consistent with its valuations, breaking ties arbitrarily), then it is also stable for the original instance I.
Next, we define social welfare, which is a measure of the efficiency of a fractional matching.
Definition 3 (Social welfare). Given an SMC instance ⟨M,W , U , V ⟩ and a fractional matching µ, the social welfare of µ is defined as
An optimal matching is one with the highest social welfare among all fractional matchings. It follows from the BvN decomposition that there is always an integral optimal matching. Similarly, an optimal stable fractional matching (respectively, optimal ε-stable fractional matching) is one with the highest social welfare among all stable (respectively, all ε-stable) fractional matchings. We will use Optimal Stable Fractional Matching and Optimal ε-Stable Fractional Matching to refer to the corresponding optimization problems. For ρ ∈ (0, 1], the term ρ-efficient refers to a stable (respectively, ε-stable) fractional matching with welfare at least ρ times the welfare of the optimal stable (respectively, ε-stable) fractional matching. Thus, an optimal stable (or ε-stable) fractional matching is 1-efficient.
Computing optimal stable fractional matchings
We will now discuss two exponential-time algorithms for Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. The first algorithm uses the following mixed integer linear program (OPT-Stab):
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The non-negative weights µ(m, w) of man-woman pairs as well as the utilities u m u m (µ) and v w v w (µ) of the agents (set in equalities (3) and (4)) are the fractional variables of (OPT-Stab). The binary variables y(m, w) encode the stability requirements for pair (m, w) in constraints (1) and (2) . Indeed, by setting y(m, w) to 1 or 0, we can require either
Constraints (5) and (6) ensure feasibility. By enumerating over all possible combinations of values for the binary variables y(m, w) for (m, w) ∈ M × W , we get 2 n 2 different linear programs, and, clearly, at least one of them must have the optimal stable fractional matching as its optimal solution.
Our second algorithm is slightly faster and solves at most O(n n ) linear programs. It exploits the following linear program (OPT-Thresh), which is defined using non-negative constants θ m for m ∈ M and θ w for w ∈ W , which we call utility thresholds.
When all utility thresholds are set to zero, the solution of (OPT-Thresh) is an optimal (i.e., welfare-maximizing) fractional matching. Using (OPT-Thresh) to maximize social welfare under stability constraints is more challenging. We say that a set of utility thresholds is stability-preserving if for every pair of agents m ∈ M and w ∈ W , either θ m ≥ U (m, w) or θ w ≥ V (m, w). Then, any fractional matching µ that is feasible for (OPT-Stab) is also feasible for (OPT-Thresh) for some stability-preserving set of utility thresholds. Conversely, any fractional matching µ that is feasible for (OPT-Thresh) with some set of stability-preserving utility thresholds is also feasible for (OPT-Stab). Therefore, in order to solve Optimal Stable Fractional Matching, it suffices to enumerate all O(n n ) sets of utility thresholds with θ m ∈ {U (m, w) : w ∈ W } for every man m ∈ M, compute utility thresholds θ w ∈ {V (m, w) : m ∈ M } for all w ∈ W so that the utility thresholds are stability-preserving, and solve (OPT-Thresh). Among these solutions, the fractional matching with highest social welfare will be the solution of Optimal Stable Fractional Matching.
STRUCTURAL PROPERTIES
In this section, we present several observations about the structure of optimal and nearly-optimal stable fractional matchings. We begin by considerably strengthening our observation in Example 1 regarding the welfare gap between stable fractional and stable integral matchings. Theorem 1. For every δ > 0 and α ≥ 2, there exists an SMC instance with ternary valuations in {0, 1, α } and an optimal stable fractional matching µ * such that any stable integral matching µ s satisfies W(µ s ) ≤ α − 1 2 − δ −1 W(µ * ).
We emphasize that Theorem 1 is a positive result as it establishes that stable fractional matchings can have much higher welfare than their integral counterparts, and highlights the importance of Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. The proof of Theorem 1 appears in the full version [7] .
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Our next observation (Proposition 2) shows that the set of stable fractional matchings can be non-convex even for binary valuations. Interestingly, this does not prevent us from efficiently solving Optimal Stable Fractional Matching in this setting (see Theorem 4 in Section 4). Proof. Consider the instance I = ⟨M,W , U , V ⟩ with three men m 1 , m 2 , m 3 and three women w 1 , w 2 , w 3 , whose graph representation and agent valuations are shown in Figure 2a . Consider the integral matchings µ (1) {
It is easy to verify that both µ (1) and µ (2) are stable for I. However, the fractional matching µ 0.5µ (1) 
The structure of stable fractional matchings becomes much more interesting (and, as we will see in Section 5, also computationally unwieldy) when we move to ternary valuations. It turns out that the support of a stable fractional matching can comprise entirely of unstable integral matchings (Proposition 3), and its size can grow linearly with the input (Theorem 3). These observations pose major limitations on the set of algorithmic tools at our disposal. Proposition 3. There exists an SMC instance with ternary valuations and a stable fractional matching µ such that every integral matching in any support of µ is unstable.
Proof. Consider the SMC instance I = ⟨M,W , U , V ⟩ with three men and three women shown in Figure 2b . The parameter α ≥ 3 is a constant. There are six different perfect integral matchings:
• Matching µ (1) , which consists of pairs (m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 ), and (m 3 , w 3 ) and has a social welfare of 6. It is easy to verify that this is the unique stable integral matching. Also, any subset of µ (1) is not stable as the pair that is missing from µ (1) will be blocking. • Matching µ (2) , which consists of pairs (m 1 , w 2 ), (m 2 , w 3 ), and (m 3 , w 1 ) and has a social welfare of 2α. The matching is not stable since the pair (m 1 , w 1 ) is blocking. • Matching µ (3) , which consists of pairs (m 1 , w 3 ), (m 2 , w 1 ), and (m 3 , w 2 ) and has a social welfare of 2α. It is not stable since (m 2 , w 2 ) is blocking. • Matching µ (4) , which consists of pairs (m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 3 ), and (m 3 , w 2 ) and has a social welfare of α + 2. It is not stable since (m 3 , w 3 ) is blocking. • Matching µ (5) , which consists of pairs (m 1 , w 3 ), (m 2 , w 2 ), and (m 3 , w 1 ) and has a social welfare of 2α + 2. It is not stable since (m 1 , w 1 ) is blocking. • Matching µ (6) , which consists of pairs (m 1 , w 2 ), (m 2 , w 1 ), and (m 3 , w 3 ) and has a social welfare of α + 2. It is not stable since the pair (m 2 , w 2 ) is blocking.
Consider the matching µ (5) . It is easy to verify that µ is stable. Indeed, the utilities of the agents under µ are given by u m 1 
Notice that only the pairs (m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 ), and (m 3 , w 3 ) need to be checked for stability, since any other pair has at least one agent with a valuation of zero (and, hence, the stability constraint for those pairs is trivially satisfied). For each of the pairs (m 1 , w 1 ), (m 2 , w 2 ), and (m 3 , w 3 ), there is some member of the pair that has a utility of at least 1 under µ, which meets the requisite stability threshold, implying that µ is stable. Finally, notice that µ(m 1 , w 1 ) = 0, which means that the unique stable integral matching µ (1) cannot occur in a support of µ.
We remark that with some extra work, one can show that the matching µ in the proof of Proposition 3 is the unique optimal stable fractional matching.
As mentioned previously in Section 2, a (stable) fractional matching is the convex combination of at most n 2 integral ones. Theorem 2 provides a stronger bound on the support size of an optimal stable fractional matching. Theorem 2. Given any SMC instance I, there exists an optimal stable fractional matching for I with at most 4n integral matchings in its support.
Proof. Let µ * be an optimal stable fractional matching for I. Recall from Section 2.1 that µ * solves the program (OPT-Thresh) for some set of stability-preserving utility thresholds. Observe that (OPT-Thresh) has n 2 free variables (we ignore here the 2n variables u m for m ∈ M and v w for w ∈ W , which depend on the remaining ones according to constraints (11) and (12)). Without loss of generality, µ * is an optimal extreme point solution of (OPT-Thresh). That is, when (OPT-Thresh) is instantiated for µ * , n 2 linearly independent inequality constraints become tight. Among them, at most 4n can correspond to the sets of constraints (9), (10), (13) , and (14) . The remaining ones must correspond to the set of constraints (15) , implying that at least n 2 − 4n free variables will be equal to zero. Thus, µ * can assign positive weights to at most 4n man-woman pairs and, consequently, can have at most 4n integral matchings in its support.
Next we show that the bound in Theorem 2 is tight up to a constant factor. Theorem 3. For every ρ ∈ (0, 1], there exists a family of SMC instances with ternary valuations for which any support of a ρ-efficient stable fractional matching consists of Ω(ρn) integral matchings.
Proof. Consider a family of SMC instances I n = ⟨M,W , U , V ⟩ with M = {m 1 , . . . , m n } and W = {w 1 , . . . , w n }, where n is odd. Let α be such that α > max n + 2, 2n ρ(n−1) . The (ternary) valuations of the agents are defined as follows: Figure 3b ). We also define a number of other integral matchings obtained by modifying µ opt , as follows: For i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−1 2 }, the matching µ (i) (see Figures 3c and 3d) is the integral matching which is obtained from µ opt by replacing
.., n−1 2 }\{i } . Also, the matching µ ( n+1 2 ) (see Figure 3e ) is the integral matching obtained from µ opt by replacing {(m 1 , w 1 ), (m n , w n−1 )} with {(m 1 , w n−1 ), (m n , w 1 )}, i.e., Now, consider the fractional matching µ
2 , µ is well-defined and has the matchings µ opt and µ (i) for i ∈ 1, . . . , n+1 2 in its support. Notice that W(µ opt ) = (n − 1)α + 2 and W(µ (i) ) = (n − 1)α for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n+1 2 }. Thus, W(µ) > (n − 1)α. It can be verified that µ is stable. Indeed, we only need to check the blocking condition for the pairs (m i , w i ) with i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. We have that v w 1 (µ) ≥ 1 (since µ ( n+1 2 ) has weight 1 α in µ and V (m n , w 1 ) = α), u m 2i (µ) ≥ 1 for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−1 2 } (since µ (i) has weight 1 α in µ and U (m 2i , w 1 ) = α), and v w 2i +1 (µ) ≥ 1 for each i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−1 2 } (since µ (i) has weight 1 α in µ and V (m 2i , w 2i+1 ) = α). The welfare of the optimal stable fractional matching must therefore be at least W(µ), and thus strictly greater than (n − 1)α.
We now claim that any ρ-efficient stable fractional matching µ ′ satisfies µ ′ (m n , w 1 ) > 0. Indeed, assuming otherwise that µ ′ (m n , w 1 ) = 0, the only pair that can give positive utility to man m 1 and woman w 1 is (m 1 , w 1 ). Hence, we must also have µ ′ (m 1 , w 1 ) = 1, and, as a result, µ ′ (m 2i , w 1 ) = 0 for i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , n−1 2 . Then, the only pair that can give positive utility to man m 2i and woman w 2i is (m 2i , w 2i ), and hence, it must also be that µ ′ (m 2i , w 2i ) = 1. Consequently, the only pair that can give positive utility to man m 2i+1 and woman w 2i+1 is (m 2i+1 , w 2i+1 ) and, hence, we must have µ ′ (m 2i+1 , w 2i+1 ) = 1. The welfare of matching µ ′ would then be 2n, which is less than ρ(n − 1)α by the assumed bound on α. In other words, the welfare of µ ′ would be less than ρ times the welfare of the stable fractional matching µ, contradicting the assumption that µ ′ is ρ-efficient.
The final step in the proof involves showing that for any stable fractional matching µ ′ with support of size at most n−1 2 ρ, we must have W(µ ′ ) < ρ(n − 1)α; the desired bound on the support size would then follow from the contrapositive. Let T i ∈ 1, 2, . . . n−1
2
: µ ′ (m 2i , w 1 ) > 0 , and T 1, 2, . . . n−1 2 \ T . Since µ ′ has support of size at most n−1 2 ρ and µ ′ (m n , w 1 ) > 0, it holds that |T | ≤ n−1 2 ρ − 1. For every i ∈ T , the agents m 2i , w 2i , m 2i+1 , and w 2i+1 can together contribute at most 2α to the welfare. On the other hand, when i ∈ T , we have µ ′ (m 2i , w 1 ) = 0, and the only pair that can give positive utility to man m 2i and woman w 2i is (m 2i , w 2i ). Therefore, we must have that µ ′ (m 2i , w 2i ) = 1. Consequently, the only pair that can give positive utility to man m 2i+1 and woman w 2i+1 is (m 2i+1 , w 2i+1 ), and it follows that µ ′ (m 2i+1 , w 2i+1 ) = 1. Therefore, when i ∈ T , the agents m 2i , w 2i , m 2i+1 , and w 2i+1 can together contribute at most 4 to the welfare. Taking the possible EC'19 Session 1a: Theory of Matching Markets contribution of pair (m 1 , w 1 ) into account, we have that
The equality follows from the definition of T , the second inequality follows from the bound on |T | above, and the third one from the definition of α. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.
Theorem 3 has an interesting algorithmic implication. As the support size can be large in any good approximation of the optimal stable fractional matching, it implies that support enumeration strategies-which have been proved useful in other contexts; see [6] and the references thereinwill be ineffective in computing (even approximate) solutions of Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. A similar implication can be shown for optimal ε-stable fractional matchings. In contrast, as we will show in Section 4, ε-stable fractional matchings of small support can be easily computed, and provide nearly the best approximation ratios achievable by efficient algorithms (under standard complexity-theoretic assumptions).
ALGORITHMIC RESULTS
We begin the discussion of our algorithmic results with binary valuations. In this setting, Optimal Stable Fractional Matching reduces to computing a maximum weight matching on a specific weighted graph associated with the given instance. Theorem 4. Given an SMC instance I = ⟨M,W , U , V ⟩ with binary valuations, an optimal stable fractional matching for I can be computed in polynomial time.
Next, we consider general valuations and show how to exploit stable integral matchings to get an approximate solution for Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. Let σ max and σ min denote the largest and the smallest non-zero valuation among all agents in I, respectively. We call a man-woman pair (m, w) light if either U (m, w) = 0 or V (m, w) = 0, and heavy otherwise. Given an SMC instance I as input, our algorithm computes a stable integral matching for I, say µ, in two steps: First, it computes a stable integral matching µ 1 using only the heavy pairs (and taking into account the stability constraints in heavy pairs only). Then, it completes the solution with a matching µ 2 of maximum welfare using the light pairs subject to feasibility constraints, i.e., using light pairs that do not share any agents with the pairs in µ 1 . The light pairs impose no additional constraints on stability, so the resulting matching is stable.
We will show that µ has approximation ratio 1 + σ max /σ min . Let µ opt be an optimal matching for I. Also, let µ opt 1 be the set of pairs of µ opt that share an agent with some pair of µ 1 , i.e., µ opt 1 {(m, w) ∈ µ opt : at least one of m or w is matched under µ 1 }. By definition of µ 2 , we have W(µ 2 ) ≥ W(µ opt \ µ opt 1 ). To complete the proof, we will need the following lemma.
Proof. Our proof constructs a mapping in which every pair (m, w) ∈ µ opt 1 \ µ 1 is mapped to one of its agents, whom we will call the witness of the pair. The mapping is such that the utility of the witness in the matching µ 1 \ µ opt 1 is at least (1 + σ max /σ min ) −1 (U (m, w) + V (m, w)). Note that once we establish the said mapping, the proof will follow, since each agent can be the witness of at most one pair of µ 
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Now consider a heavy pair (m, w) ∈ µ opt 1 \µ 1 . If µ 1 contains a pair (m, w ′ ) with U (m, w ′ ) ≥ U (m, w), select agent m to be the witness, otherwise select agent w. Note that in the latter case, stability of µ 1 implies the existence of (m ′ , w) ∈ µ 1 such that V (m ′ , w) ≥ V (m, w). Hence, the utility of the witness of (m, w) in µ 1 \µ (m, w) ). Now, Lemma 1 gives the desired approximation ratio, as follows:
For ternary valuations in {0, 1, α }, the above algorithm gives a (1 + α)-approximation. An improved approximation for ternary valuations can be achieved using the following modification: When computing the stable integral matching, resolve ties in favour of the pairs (m, w) with the highest U (m, w) + V (m, w). The next lemma establishes an improved approximation ratio of max{2, α }.
Lemma 2. The modified algorithm for SMC instances with ternary valuations in
Proof. For a pair (m, w) of matching µ opt 1 \ µ 1 , we use the term neighborhood to refer to the pairs of µ 1 \ µ opt 1 that use agent m or w. We will show that the total utility from pairs in the neighborhood of (m, w) is at least min{1, 2/α } (U (m, w) + V (m, w)). Since each pair of µ 1 \ µ opt 1 can be in the neighborhood of at most two pairs of µ opt 1 \ µ 1 , this will give us the desired inequality. Indeed, by the particular way we resolve ties in the ordinal preferences before computing the matching µ 1 , a heavy pair (m, w) in µ The above discussion is summarized in the following statement.
Theorem 5. There is a polynomial-time algorithm which, given an SMC instance I with an optimal matching µ opt , computes a stable integral matching µ with W(µ) ≥ min{ 1 2 , 1 α }W(µ opt ) if I has ternary valuations in {0, 1, α }, and W(µ) ≥ (1 + σ max /σ min ) −1 W(µ opt ) in general, where σ max and σ min denote the highest and the lowest non-zero valuation in I, respectively.
We conclude this section by considering approximate stability. For general valuations, we present a polynomial-time 1/ε-approximation algorithm for Optimal ε-Stable Fractional Matching, which constructs an ε-stable fractional matching with a small support by combining an optimal matching with a stable integral matching. Theorem 6. There is a polynomial-time algorithm that given any SMC instance I = ⟨M,W , U , V ⟩ and any rational ε ∈ [0, 1], computes a fractional matching µ that is ε-stable for I such that W(µ) ≥ εW(µ opt ), where µ opt is an optimal matching for I.
Proof. Let µ s be any stable integral matching and µ opt be an optimal matching for I. Note that both µ s and µ opt can be computed in polynomial time. We will show that µ (1 − ε)µ s + εµ opt satisfies the desired properties. Indeed, W(µ) = (1−ε)W(µ s )+εW(µ opt ) ≥ εW(µ opt ). Furthermore, since µ s is stable, we have that for any man-woman pair (m, w) ∈ M × W , either u m (µ s ) ≥ U (m, w) or v w (µ s ) ≥ V (m, w). The former condition implies that u m (µ) ≥ (1 − ε)u m (µ s ) ≥ (1 − ε)U (m, w), while the latter condition gives v w (µ) ≥ (1 − ε)V (m, w). Either way, the pair (m, w) is ε-stable.
HARDNESS OF APPROXIMATION
In this section, we present our inapproximability statements, which are by far the technically most involved results in the paper. We present polynomial-time reductions which, given a 3SAT formula ϕ of a particular structure, construct SMC instances that simulate the evaluation of ϕ for every variable assignment. The constructed SMC instances consist of several gadgets including an accumulator. The simulation of the evaluation of ϕ by the SMC instance is such that:
(a) when ϕ has a satisfying assignment, there is a stable (or ε-stable) fractional matching where the contribution of the agents in the accumulator gadget to the welfare can be large and dominates the contribution from the remaining SMC instance and (b) when ϕ is not satisfiable, the contribution of the accumulator and, subsequently, the total welfare of any stable (or ε-stable) fractional matching is very small.
Hence, distinguishing between SMC instances with stable (or ε-stable) fractional matchings of very high and very low welfare would allow us to decide 3SAT. We have two inapproximability statements: Theorem 7 for Optimal Stable Fractional Matching and Theorem 8 for Optimal ε-Stable Fractional Matching.
Theorem 7. For every constant δ > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate Optimal Stable Fractional Matching for SMC instances with ternary valuations in {0, 1, α }to within a factor of (i) α − 1/2 − δ if α = O(n), and (ii) Ω(n 1−δ ) otherwise.
Theorem 8. For any constants ε ∈ (0, 0.03] and δ > 0, it is NP-hard to approximate Optimal ε-Stable Fractional Matching to within a factor of 1/ε − δ .
We will prove Theorem 7 here; the proof of Theorem 8, which uses similar gadgets but is slightly more involved, appears in the full version [7] . Since the proof is long, we have divided it into three parts: the description of the reduction (Section 5.1), technical claims with gadget properties (Section 5.2), and the proof of the inapproximability result (Section 5.3).
The reduction
In particular, we present a polynomial-time reduction from 2P2N-3SAT, the special case of 3SAT consisting of 3-CNF clauses in which every variable appears four times: twice as a positive literal and twice as a negative one. 2P2N-3SAT is known to be NP-hard [39] . Our reduction takes as input an instance of 2P2N-3SAT consisting of N (boolean) variables x 1 , x 2 , ..., x N , and a 3-CNF formula ϕ with L = 4N /3 clauses c 1 , c 2 , ..., c L . Without loss of generality, we assume that each clause in ϕ consists of distinct literals.
Given the instance of 2P2N-3SAT, our reduction generates an instance I = ⟨M,W , U , V ⟩ of Optimal Stable Fractional Matching. As usual, we denote by n the number of men (or women) in I. We will use a positive integer parameter k which will determine the size of n; in particular, n = O(N +k). We define I by referring to its graph representation, which consists of variable gadgets, clause gadgets, variable-clause connectors, an accumulator, and clause-accumulator connectors. For each gadget, we classify the edges (i.e., man-woman pairs and their valuations) into the following three types: Recall that any pair (m, w) that does not appear as an edge in the graph representation has U (m, w) = V (m, w) = 0. For every clause c, instance I has a clause gadget with three men m c , e c 1 , e c 2 , three women w c 1 , w c 2 , w c 3 , and the nine balanced edges between them, as shown in Figure 4b . For every appearance of a literal in a clause, there is a variable-clause connector (or VC-connector). VC-connectors have different structure depending (1) on whether they correspond to positive or negative literals, and (2) on the value of α. In each case, we identify one edge of the VC-connector as the input, and either one or two edges as the output.
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Specifically, for every positive literal x whose i-th appearance (i ∈ {1, 2}) is as the j-th literal (j ∈ {1, 2, 3}) of clause c, I has a VC-connector defined as follows:
• When α ≥ 2, the VC-connector consists of a single woman-heavy edge between m x i (from the variable gadget corresponding to variable x) and w c j (from the clause gadget corresponding to clause c), as shown in Figure 5a . This edge is simultaneously the input and the output edge of the VC-connector. 
Gadget properties
We will now prove several important properties (Claims 9-12) of our construction. The proofs appear in the full version [7] .
Claim 9. For every variable x, a stable fractional matching µ satisfies at least one of the following:
, w x 2 ) = 1. We remark that the two conditions in the statement of Claim 9 affect the weight of the input edges of the VC-connectors that are attached to the variable gadget in any stable fractional matching. In particular, condition (1) implies that the weight assigned to the input edges of the VC-connectors that correspond to the two appearances of the positive literal x in clauses must be 0. To see why, observe that these input edges are incident to nodes m x 1 and m x 2 , and the total weight of all edges incident to each of these nodes cannot exceed 1. Condition (2) has a similar implication for the edges associated with the negative literal x.
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Claim 10. Any stable fractional matching that assigns a weight of 0 to the input edge of a VCconnector must assign a weight of 0 to its output edge(s) as well.
Claim 11. Any stable fractional matching that assigns a weight of 0 to all output edges of the VC-connectors of clause c must assign a weight of 0 to the CA-connector of clause c as well.
Claim 12. Any stable fractional matching that assigns a weight of 0 to some CA-connector must assign a total weight of 1 to the tine edges and a weight of 1 to every balanced edge of the accumulator.
Proof of inapproximability
Lemma 3. If formula ϕ is not satisfiable, then any stable fractional matching of I has welfare at most 80α N + 4(k − 1).
Proof. We will first show that if ϕ is not satisfiable, then any stable fractional matching of I assigns weight 0 to some CA-connector. For the sake of contradiction, consider a stable fractional matching that assigns a strictly positive weight to all CA-connectors. We will construct a truth assignment for the formula ϕ (contradicting the assumption of the lemma) by repeating the following process for every clause c of ϕ: Let ℓ be a literal that appears in c such that the output edge(s) of the VC-connector, that corresponds to the appearance of ℓ in c, have strictly positive total weight. By Claim 11, such a literal must exist. We set ℓ to 1 (true). For every variable that has not received a value in this way, we arbitrarily set it to 1.
The above assignment satisfies all the clauses. To show that it is also valid, we need to argue that there is no variable x such that both literals x and x have been set to 1. Assume, to the contrary, that literal x is set to 1 due to its appearance in a clause c 1 , and literal x is set to 1 due to its appearance in a different clause c 2 . Thus, in the above assignment, the output edge(s) of the VC-connector between the literal x and the clause c 1 , as well as the VC-connector between the literal x and the clause c 2 have strictly positive (total) weight. By Claim 10, the input edges of both VC-connectors also have strictly positive weight. Let i 1 , i 2 ∈ {1, 2} be such that the i 1 -th appearance of x is in the clause c 1 and the i 2 -th appearance of x is in the clause c 2 . Therefore, the said input edges are incident to the nodes m x i 1 and w x i 2 . Using Claim 9, we get that the total weight on the edges incident to one of m x i 1 or w x i 2 exceeds 1, contradicting feasibility. Thus, the above assignment must be valid, which, in turn, implies that any stable fractional matching assigns weight 0 to some CA-connector.
By Claim 12, the contribution of the accumulator to the welfare is exactly 4k − 2 (2 from the tine edges plus 2 from each balanced edge). Let us now consider the contribution of the edges that do not belong to the accumulator. This comprises of
• a total value of 20 for the ten balanced edges of each of the N variable gadgets, • a total value of α (respectively, 2 + 2α) for the edges of each of the 2N VC-connectors corresponding to a positive literal when α ≥ 2 (respectively, α ∈ (3/2, 2)), • a total value of 2 + 2α (respectively, 6 + 6α) for the edges of each of the 2N VC-connectors corresponding to a negative literal when α ≥ 2 (respectively, α ∈ (3/2, 2)), • a total value of 18 + α for the nine balanced edges of each of the 4N /3 clause gadgets and their corresponding CA-connectors.
It can be easily seen that 80α N − 2 is a (loose) upper bound on the total value from these edges.
Lemma 4. If ϕ is satisfiable, then there exists a stable fractional matching of I with welfare at least 4(k − 1)(α − 1/2).
Proof. Starting from a satisfying assignment for ϕ, we will construct a stable fractional matching µ in which the welfare of the accumulator gadget is at least 4(k − 1)(α − 1/2).
Variable gadgets. For the edges of the variable gadget of the variable x, µ is defined as:
• If x is true, then µ(m
, f x 2 ) = 1, and the remaining edges have weight 0.
Clause gadgets and CA-connectors. For each clause, select one of the true literals (tie-break arbitrarily) and call it active. Note that each clause has an active literal in a satisfying assignment. Consider the clause c, and let ℓ i be its active literal for some i ∈ {1, 2, 3}. Also, let i 1 , i 2 ∈ {1, 2, 3}\{i} denote the other two indices. Set µ(e c 1 , w c i 1 ) = µ(e c 2 , w c i 2 ) = 1, and set the weight of the remaining balanced edges to 0. Assign a weight of 1 to the CA-connector, i.e., µ(m c , w c ) = 1.
VC-connectors.
For every non-active VC-connector, set the weight of its balanced edges (if any) to 1 and the weight of the remaining edges to 0. For every active VC-connector corresponding to the i-th appearance of the positive literal x as the j-th literal of clause c (i ∈ {1, 2}, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}), the weights of its edges are as follows:
• When α ≥ 2, we set µ(m x i , w c j ) = 1/2. • When α ≥ 2, we set µ(m i , w i ) = 1/α for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, µ(e 2 i , w i ) = 1 − 2/α, µ(m i+1 , w i ) = 1/α, µ(e 1 i , f 1 i ) = 1, µ(e 1 i , w i ) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, µ(m i , f 2 i ) = 0, µ(m i , f 3 i ) = 1 − 2/α, and µ(e 3 i , f 2 i ) = 1 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k}. Among these, any edge with a positive weight is either man-or woman-heavy, and hence, its contribution to the social welfare is α times its weight. It can be verified that the total contribution is 4(k − 1)(α − 1/2) + 1.
• When α ∈ (3/2, 2), we set µ(m 1 , w 1 ) = 1/α, µ(m 2 , w 2 ) = α + 1/α − 2, µ(m i , w i ) = 1 − 1/α for all i ∈ {3, . . . , k}, µ(m i+1 , w i ) = 1 − 1/α for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, µ(e 1 i , w i ) = 0 for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, µ(m 2 , f 2 2 ) = 2 − α, µ(m i , f 2 i ) = 0 for all i ∈ {3, . . . , k}, µ(e 1 1 , f 1 1 ) = α − 1, µ(e 2 2 , f 2 2 ) = α − 2/α, µ(e 2 k , f 2 k ) = 1, µ(e 1 i , f 1 i ) = 2 − 2/α for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}, µ(e 2 i , f 2 i ) = 2 − 2/α for all i ∈ {3, . . . , k − 1}, µ(e 1 1 , w 2 ) = 2 − α, µ(e 1 i , w i+1 ) = 2/α − 1 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}, and µ(m i+1 , f 2 i ) = 2/α − 1 for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k − 1}. Except for the balanced edge (m 2 , f 2 2 ), every edge with a positive weight among the ones listed above is either manor woman-heavy, and hence, its contribution to the social welfare is α times its weight. It can be verified that the total contribution in this case is 4(k − 1)(α − 1/2) + 2α 2 − 7α + 7. In each case, the accumulator contributes at least 4(k − 1)(α − 1/2) to the social welfare, as desired.
The feasibility of µ can be verified by inspection. To see why µ is stable, note that we only need to check for the balanced edges, as the man-or woman-heavy edges and the remaining pairs do not impose any constraints on stability. For the balanced edges, stability is established by the following series of observations (we will use the term 'stabilized by' to denote that an agent's utility is at least 1): The variable gadget for the variable x (Figure 4a) is stabilized by the agents f x 1 , f x 2 , e x 3 along with m x 1 , m x 2 (if x is true) or w x 1 , w x 2 (if x is false). The clause gadget for clause c (Figure 4b ) with EC'19 Session 1a: Theory of Matching Markets active index i (and non-active indices i 1 and i 2 ) is stabilized by the agents e c 1 , e c 2 , w c i , w c i 1 , w c i 2 ; in particular, the edge (m c , w c i ) is stabilized by w c i because an active literal triggers the woman-heavy edge in the VC-connector. A VC connector is stabilized by w x,c (Figure 5b) , m x,c (Figure 5c ), or m x,c 1 , w x,c 2 , and m x,c 3 (Figure 5d ). Finally, the tine edges in the accumulator (Figure 6 ) are stabilized by w c 1 , . . . , w c L (because we trigger the CA-connector), and the remaining balanced edges are stabilized by w i 's and m i 's except for m 1 . Overall, µ is a feasible stable fractional matching.
We are ready to prove Theorem 7. If α < N 1+1/δ , we use our construction with any k satisfying k − 1 ≥ 20α N (α −1/2−δ ) δ . It is easy to verify that the reduction is polynomial-time. Furthermore, from Lemma 3, we know that the welfare of µ when ϕ is not satisfiable is at most
This number is at least α −1/2−δ times smaller than the welfare of µ when ϕ is satisfiable (Lemma 4). This establishes the inapproximability bound in part (i) of Theorem 7.
If α ≥ N 1+1/δ , we use our construction with k = N 1+1/δ . Once again, the reduction is polynomialtime, and the instance I has n = Θ(N 1+1/δ ) men and women. Observe that α = Ω(n), k = Θ(n), and N = O(n δ ). Hence, the welfare of µ when ϕ is not satisfiable is at most 80α N + 4(k − 1) ≤ 80α N + 4N 1+1/δ ≤ 84α N = O(αn δ ).
On the other hand, the welfare of µ when ϕ is satisfiable is at least 4(k − 1)(α − 1/2), i.e., Ω(αn). This establishes the bound in part (ii), and with it, completes the proof of Theorem 7.
